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In this paper, we have obtained closed-form solutions in Cass-Koopmans growth models with 
heterogeneous agents. The relationship between the form of production function and the 
dynamics of income distribution is made explicit. We then use this relationship to determine what 
production structure is simultaneously consistent with facts on growth and income inequality. Our 
empirical findings give support to models with decreasing returns in the reproducible factor.  
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1. Introduction 
A typical feature of endogenous growth models is that the production structure exhibits 
linearity in a reproducible factor. In Romer (1986), the reproducible factor is knowledge; in Lucas 
(1988), it is human capital; whereas in Rebelo (1991), it is a composite capital stock. Even in the 
models emphasizing technological change such as Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a, 1991b), and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the linearity assumption exists in the R&D 
sector.  
The validity of this linearity feature is examined in a number of empirical work. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) finds that the ‘AK’-type models are inconsistent with the empirical 
evidence on convergence. Jones (1995a) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1996) test the persistence of 
policy shocks on economic growth and obtain contradictory results: the latter supports the 
endogenous growth framework whereas the former rejects it and advocates instead a semi-
endogenous growth framework described in Jones (1995b). In this paper, we would like to test 
the endogenous growth theory by exploring its implications on the dynamics of income 
distribution. 
Prominent recent examples of theoretical and empirical studies on income distribution 
include Lucas (1992), Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994). Our paper, however, is more closely related to Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and 
Ventura (1996). In essence, our model is a special case of these two studies. Chatterjee (1994) 
analyses the transitional dynamics and the distribution of wealth in a neoclassical growth model. 
In particular, he focuses on how the form of utility function may affect the results. Caselli and 
Ventura (1996) is much more general and rigorous but again with a focus different from ours. 
They first demonstrate that income distribution can display any dynamic pattern once the utility 
function is not confined to the special classes studied in Chatterjee (1994). Then, using a U.S. 
panel data set which reports income at the family level, they find that there has been a reversal in 
distributive dynamics during the 1970-1990 period. They argue that this reversal, albeit consistent   3
with broad consumer preferences, casts doubt on the simple framework of logarithmic utility 
function and the Cobb-Douglas technology. 
None of these two studies, however, sheds any light on the debate raised at the beginning. 
The criticism on the endogenous growth theory so far is not on the form of utility function used. 
Typically, a CES utlity function with zero subsistence consumption level is assumed. The 
criticism is on the production structure, which we investigate here. In this respect, we differ from 
Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (1996). More importantly, we obtain closed-form 
solutions that make the analysis more easily accessible. 
  We show explicitly in a set of examples that if the initial capital stock in an economy is 
less than the golden-rule capital stock, wealth will become more evenly distributed over time 
when the technology exhibits decreasing returns in the reproducible factor. The income 
distribution is time-invariant when the technology is linear in the reproducible factor. This 
implication is then tested empirically. 
In our empirical test, we use a newly compiled cross-country panel data from the World 
Bank by Deininger and Squire (1996). We show that as an economy grows, income distribution 
does improve. This holds even when we explicitly control for government spendings (on 
education, welfare, social security, health and infrastructure) that are supposed to lower income 
inequalities. This empirical finding therefore gives support to models with decreasing returns in 
the reproducible factor. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the standard Cass-
Koopmans model with heterogeneous individuals. In section 3, we present a version of an 
endogenous growth model and study its implications for the dynamics of income distribution. 
Section 4 presents an empirical test of the implications, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
   4
2.  An Extended Cass-Koopmans Model  
We consider an economy with a single consumption good and an infinite number of long-
lived agents situated in the real interval [0,1]. These agents are indexed by  ] 1 , 0 [ , ∈ i i . The 
preferences of agent i are given by 
  dt e




















where  i c  is individual i’s consumption of the single good, σ  is the inverse of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, and  ρ  is the rate of time preference.  
Let  i a  denote the amount of asset that individual i holds. We normalize the time so that 
each individual has one unit of labor to supply and the supply is inelastic. The accumulation of 
the asset is thus as follows: 
  i i i c w ra a − + =   with  ) 0 ( i a given, (2) 
where r is the market real interest rate and w the real wage. 
 Consumer  i’s decision on consumption and saving can be obtained from maximizing (1) 











and the transversality condition for optimality is as usual:  0 →
− − t
i i e a c
ρ σ . 
  We assume that there are an infinite number of identical competitive firms, indexed by 
] 1 , 0 [ , ∈ j j . The production function of firm j is 
 
α α − =
1
j j j L AK y  (4) 
where  j K  is the capital input and  j L  is the labor input. Parameter A measures the total factor 
productivity and α is in (0,1). These competitive firms take the real interest rate r and the real 





j j L AK r  (5) 
 
α α α
− − = j j L AK w ) 1 (  (6) 
Since these firms are assumed to be identical, we have  K K j ≡ , and  L L j ≡  for any j. 
In equilibrium, demand equals supply. In particular, the aggregate demand for capital K 
equals the aggregate supply of funds available, ∫
1
0
di ai ; and the aggregate demand for labor L 
equals the aggregate supply of labor, which is unity
3. 
  The question we want to study is: How will income distribution evolve over time if 
individuals’ initial asset holdings  ] 1 , 0 [ ), 0 ( ∈ i ai  are different from each other? Will income 
distribution become more equitable? 
  Even in this simple model, the answer can not be obtained directly. The difficulty is due 
to two reasons. First, there is heterogeneity in agents. Second, the real interest rate r and the real 
wage w can change over time as the aggregate capital stock increases or decreases. Chatterjee 
(1994) shows that for some classes of utility functions, which include the ones we study here, 
income distribution will be more equitable as time evolves if the economy starts with a capital 
stock lower than the golden rule. Caselli and Ventura (1996) show that with more general 
preferences, income distribution can display any dynamic pattern. The mathematical proofs in 
these two papers are done skillfully but most readers will have problems digesting them. In this 
paper, we will use a few examples in which closed form solutions exist so that readers may have 
a clearer picture of how income distribution evolves over time. To obtain closed form solutions, 
we need to impose a constraint on the parameters across the utility function and the production 
function, namely  α σ = . This is the same constraint imposed in Xie (1991, 1994), and Devarajan, 
Xie and Zou (1998). By doing this, we are not claiming that in reality σ and α are the same. The   6
objective here is purely technical: imposing  α σ =  greatly simplifies the dynamics and makes 
qualitative results readily accessible. This approach complements the rigorous analysis in 
Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (1996) in a useful way: it allows us to obtain an insight 
as to how the form of the aggregate production function may affect the dynamics of income 
distribution.  
The equations that govern the evolution of an individual’s asset can be summarized as 
follows. 
  i i i c AK a AK a − − + =
− α α α α ) 1 (












Note that in the above equations, the real interest rate and the real wage have been substituted in 
by their expressions in equations (5) and (6). Given the initial asset  ) 0 ( i a  and the transversality 
condition, we can solve in principle for  i a  once the aggregate capital stock is known. Therefore, 
what we need to find out is the evolution of the aggregate capital stock. 
 Since    ∫ =
1
0
di a K i , we have: 
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where  ∫ =
1
0
di c C i  is the aggregate consumption. From equation (8), we see that the growth rate 










                                                                                                                                                 
3 Since the firms are identical and are assumed to be situated in the interval [0,1], it follows that the 
aggregate demand for capital is the same as the average demand for capital. Similarly, since individuals fill 
the interval [0,1], the aggregate supply of labor equals the average supply of labor, which is unity.   7
  Equations (9) and (10) normally do not lead to an explicit optimal consumption rule, but 












which has an obvious solution  α ρ = K C . Other solutions to (11) are invalid because they are 
not consistent with individual i’s optimization behavior that requires the transversality condition 
to be satisfied.  α ρK C =  is thus the only optimal consumption rule in the aggregate sense. 
Therefore, the evolution of aggregate capital stock is much simplified: 
  , α ρ
α K AK K − =  with  ∫ =
1
0
) 0 ( ) 0 ( di a K i  (12) 
 Define    i φ  = C ci . From equation (8) and (10), we notice that  i φ  is constant over time 
although it may be different for a different i. For the evolution of individual’s asset, we have the 
following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1.  The asset holding of individual i at time t is given by  
  () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) / ii i at K A K
α φ αφ ρ =+ − −    (13) 
where  i φ  is given by 
  (0) (1 ) (0)














Proof.  Obviously  i c  satisfies equation (8) because it is a constant factor of C. There are two 
things we need to verify. First, given K satisfying equation (12),  i a  thus determined in (13) 
satisfies equation (7). This is straightforward and is checked. Second, we need to show that  i a  
and  i c  satisfy the transversality condition  0 →
− − t
i i e a c
ρ σ . Note that equation (12) indicates that 
K will converge to a steady state 
* K , where 
) 1 /( 1 * ] [
α ρ α
− = A K . Thus, C will converge to   8
α ρ /
* K . As a result,  i c  and  i a  will also converge to their steady state values. The transversality 
condition is thus satisfied. 
REMARK: The result here is rather intuitive. Obviously φ i should depend on individual i’s 
initial asset holding relative to the initial aggregate (the average) capital stock. Equation (14) says 
that  φ i will be greater (smaller) than unity if individual i is initially richer (poorer) than the 
average. As a result, when individual i is richer than the average,  i a  is a concave function of K. 
When individual i is poorer than the average,  i a  is a convex function of K. This remark leads to 
the following corollary (see Figure 1 for illustration). 
 
Corollary: If 
* ) 0 ( K K < , then income distribution improves over time. If 
* ) 0 ( K K > , income 
distribution worsens over time. 
  As we believe that no country has passed the golden rule steady state yet, the above 
corollary states that we should expect the income distribution to get better with income growth. 
This conclusion however may break down, as we will see in the next section, if endogenous 
growth is allowed.  
 
3. A Model of Endogenous Growth 
We now introduce positive externality in goods production to generate long run growth 
as in Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The version presented here is adopted from Xie (1991). 
Specifically, the production function of the competitive firm j is extended to include an 
externality term: 
  ) (
1 K L AK y j j j Γ =
−α α  (15) 
where K denotes the aggregate capital stock as before.  ) (K Γ  is an increasing function of K, 
meaning that as the aggregate capital increases, the productivity of capital and labor employed in   9
firm j becomes higher. In this case, the real interest rate and the real wage can be calculated as 
follows. 
  ) (
1 1 K L AK r j j Γ =
− − α α α  (16) 
  ) ( ) 1 ( K L AK w j j Γ − =
−α α α . (17) 
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The equations that determine individual’s asset accumulation are thus as follows. 
  i i i c K AK a K AK a − Γ − + Γ =
− ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
























Unfortunately, these equations are not easy to solve for arbitrary function of  ) (K Γ , even 
if we impose the assumption  σ α = . Numerical methods are therefore needed to reach any 
reliable conclusions. But before we call in the researchers equipped with numerical techniques, 
we want to see whether we can make some intelligent qualitative conjectures about how income 
distribution evolves as economy moves on. 
  To this end, let us look at one special functional form of  ) (K Γ , namely, 
α − = Γ
1 ) ( K K . In 
this case, the real interest rate is constant,  A r α = . Thus, the growth rate of consumption for all 
individuals are constant over time, so is the aggregate consumption. And the evolutions of 
aggregate capital and individual i’s asset are as follows. 
  C AK K − =   (22)   10
  i i i c AK Aa a − − + = ) 1 ( α α  . (23) 
The solution now is obvious. That is, 
 
σ ρ α t A e K K
) ( ) 0 (
− =  (24) 
 
σ ρ α t A
i i e a a
) ( ) 0 (
− = . (25) 
In other words,  i a  is always proportional to K. As a result, income distribution stays the same 
over time (see Figure 2 for illustration). 
  Let us summarize what we have obtained thus far. The example in the last section 
corresponds to the case where  1 ) ( ≡ Γ K . There, we find that the optimal trajectory is concave for 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai >  and convex for  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai < . In the case when 
α − ≡ Γ
1 ) ( K K , the optimal 
trajectory is linear for any  ) 0 ( i a . In both examples, these optimal trajectories can be extended 
back to the origin. If we look at these two examples closely, we find that the first example has the 
property that the aggregate production is concave in K, and in the second example the aggregate 
production function is linear in K. Based on this observation, we have the following conjecture. 
Conjecture: If  ) (K Γ  is such that the aggregate production function  ) (K AK Γ
α  is concave, then 
the optimal trajectory is concave for  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai >  and convex for  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai < . If the aggregate 
production function ) (K AK Γ
α is convex
4, then the optimal trajectory is convex for  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai >  
and concave for  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( K ai < . 
If our conjecture is right, then when the aggregate production function  ) (K AK Γ
α  is 
convex, income distribution gets worse as the economy moves forward. 
                                                 
4 To make sure that the optimization problem is well-defined, we need to assume that 
) 1 /( ) ( lim σ ρ
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4. Empirical Testing  
In our theoretical discussions above, we find that whether income distribution will 
improve over time depends on the strict concavity of technology. In principle, we can examine 
the empirical evidence on the dynamics of income distribution to determine whether the existing 
linearity feature assumed in the Endogenous Growth literature is valid or not. Given the fact that 
for any particular country, time series data on income distribution (the Gini coefficient) is 
available for only scattered periods, we have to enlarge the sample by pooling countries together. 
We then run a regression of Gini against income level to see if income distribution improves as 
an economy expands. If the answer is positive, then the production structure should exhibit 
decreasing returns in the reproducible factor rather than constant or increasing returns. Of course,  
we need to control for other obvious variables which affect income distribution, namely 
government spending and taxes. To this end, let us first describe the newly compiled data set on 
income distribution. 
 
4.1 Data description 
Many existing empirical studies have been hampered by the data problems on income 
distribution. The commonly available data sets have used very different definitions of the Gini 
coefficients and covered very few observations over time and across countries. In our study, the 
data on income distribution (the Gini coefficients) are taken from the Deininger and Squire 
(1996)
5. This is a newly compiled and greatly expanded data set on income distribution. To 
minimize the methodological differences in defining the Gini coefficients, only the Gini 
coefficients from national coverage household survey based on gross income, net income or 
expenditure are selected. Thus the consistency of the definition of the Gini coefficients is well 
                                                 
5 We have utilized the new data set to study other dynamic issues related to income distribution; see Li and 
Zou (1998); and Li, Squire and Zou (1998).   12
maintained. We found that in our sample, it is statistically significant that the Gini coefficients 
based on gross income is 4.0 higher than those based on net income or expenditure, while other 
differences in definitions such as household vs. personal income, do not have statistically 
significant impact on the Gini measurement. Thus, if the Gini coefficient is 35 based on gross 
income, then the definition-adjusted Gini coefficient is 31, which is comparable to the Gini 
coefficient based on net income or expenditure. Therefore, the Gini coefficient data used in our 
analysis can be regarded as the after-tax measurement of income inequality. 
  The current sample of the Gini coefficients (after adjusting for difference in definitions, 
denoted as GINI) consists of 84 countries with a total of 583 observations for a time period from 
1950 to 1992. Among the 84 countries, 37 have less than or equal to 3 observations; 30 have 
between 4 to 9 observations; 11 have between 10 to 20 observations; and six have more than 20 
observations. This is a highly unbalanced panel data set of income inequality. See Table 1 for the 
summary statistics of GINI by individual countries. The maximum value of GINI is 58.6 for 
Gabon, the minimum  value of GINI is 16.81 for Bulgaria. 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of GINI by different samples. The overall mean 
and standard deviation are 34.66 and 8.63, respectively. We further divide the overall sample into 
high-income sample and middle- and low-income sample according to the classification of the 
World Development Report by the World Bank. There are 24 high-income countries and 60 
middle- and low-income countries. The high-income countries are more equal in income 
distribution in the sense that the mean of GINI is 30.94 (standard deviation 4.36) compared to 
38.14 (Standard deviation 10.07) for the middle- and low-income sample, although for some of 
the (former) socialist countries in the middle- and low-income sample the Gini coefficients are 
low. 
  The income level data (real per capita GDP in constant dollars expressed in international 
prices, Y), is taken from Summers and Heston (1995) where it is denoted as RGDPCH there. 
Since for most countries, the coverage of the Gini coefficients determines the number of valid   13
observations in our sample, we only report results with respect to the sample where a match with 
the Gini data is found. Thus the complete sample includes 84 countries with 583 observations. 
For a summary statistics of the income level data Y by individual countries, please refer to Table 
2. The maximum is $18,095 for the US, the minimum is $419 for Tanzania. The overall mean and 
standard deviations are $6,435 and $4,655, respectively. Finally, the summary statistics of Y by 
subsamples are reported in Table 3. Note that the high-income sample has low mean Gini while 
the middle- and low-income sample has high mean Gini. Therefore income level and Gini are in 
general negatively correlated. 
 
4.2 Theoretical predictions and regression estimation results 
 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to see what production structure is consistent 
with facts on growth and income inequality. In particular, if we find that income distribution gets 
more even as income increases, then our theoretical sections argue that the production function 
should exhibit decreasing returns in the reproducible factor. In this case, the empirical evidence 
would cast doubt on the endogenous growth theories which rely on linearity or convexity in 
factors such as knowledge, human capital and physical capital.  
What we are interested in is the sign of the coefficient in a regression of Gini against 
income level. As we said earlier, we probably need to control for taxation and government 
spending. Since taxation and government spending are highly correlated, we only include one of 
them in the regression. When taxation is included, the estimated coefficient on taxation is 
negative and statistically significant
6 as expected. The coefficients on Y are all negative but 
mostly insignificant. This is probably due to a 35% loss of observations because some countries 
do not have taxation data during early periods. Government spending data, however, are rather 
                                                 
6 The statistical test of the significance of the regression coefficients is based on a 5% t-test. This is the 
same for the other discussions if not otherwise specified.   14
complete and using this variable does not lead to any severe loss of observations. Therefore, let us 
focus on the following regression
7: 
  it it i it i i it u G Y GINI + + + = η β α  (26) 
where i is the country index (i = 1, 2, …, N), t is the time index (t = 1, 2, …, T), and  it u  are iid 
errors. The dependent variable GINI is the Gini coefficients adjusted for differences in 
definitions, the independent variables are the real per capita income, Y, and the government 
spending,  G.  G represents the government spending as a share of GDP and is taken from 
Summers and Heston (1995). On the basis of our theoretical model, we expect  i β  to be negative 
if a concave technology prevails and to be positive if a convex technology prevails.  i η  should be 
negative because theoretically government spending improves income distribution. 
  For the empirical estimation, we consider both the fixed-effects and the error components 
model specifications. For the fixed-effects model, we test for the equality of dummy coefficients. 
For the error components model two specification tests are conducted, the Lagrangian Multiplier 
test and the Hausman (1978) test. The Lagrangian Multiplier test is a  ) 1 (
2 χ -test for error 
components, with the null 
  H0: Individual error components do not exist.  (27) 
The Hausman test is a  ) (
2 k χ -test for error components, with the null 
  H0: Error components model is the correct specification  (28) 
where k is the number of regressors in the regression.
8 In general, our empirical results show that 
all the specification tests for the fixed-effects model or error components model do not justify the 
use of a simple pooled regression. Thus the pooled regression results are not reported. 
                                                 
7 We also considered a simpler version of regression (26),  it it i i it u Y GINI + + = β α . The estimated 
regression coefficients and their statistical significance for Y are very close to those of regression (26), 
therefore the results are not reported. They are available upon request. 
8 Since the Gini data for individual countries are in general time series with many missing observations, we 
will not further pursue using various specification tests for serial correlation and causality, or using lagged 
variables as instruments to account for possible endogeneity.   15
Table 4 reports the estimation results of regression (26). Since government spending (on 
education, welfare, social security, health and infrastructure, etc.) often intends to provide a more 
equitable distribution for the society, it is expected to reduce the degree of income inequality. 
Indeed, that is what we found in the estimation results. Government spending has coefficients that 
are negative and significant in most of the cases.
9 
Our main interest is on the sign of coefficient on the income level. Table 4 reports that 
the coefficients of Y are negative and significant for the middle- and low-income sample. For the 
high-income sample, they are negative, although insignificant. When using the complete sample, 
the coefficients are negative, but only significant for the error components (EC) model. We 
interpret this regression result as a support of production structure that exhibits strict decreasing 
returns in the reproducible factor. Therefore, our study on the dynamics of income distribution 
complements the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Jones (1995a) that question the 
validity of the endogenous growth framework. 
 
4.3 The Kuznets hypothesis 
A study on income distribution will be incomplete if the issue of the Kuznets hypothesis 
is not addressed. Since existing empirical findings give contradictory results, it would be 
interesting to know whether our new data set supports the Kuznets hypothesis. 
  We directly test the Kuznets hypothesis between inequality and the level of income by 
considering the following regression: 
  it it i it i i it u Y Y GINI + + + =
2 ) ( γ β α  (29) 
The Kuznets hypothesis suggests that inequality is low at lower income level but later increases at 
higher income level with economic growth. As the income level further grows, inequality 
                                                 
9 This is also true for most of the cases in Table 5 where we test the Kuznets hypothesis and in Tables 6 and 
7 where we perform the sensitivity analysis.   16
decreases. Thus the relationship between income distribution and income level can be described 
by an inverted U-curve. Empirically this can be verified if the coefficient of 
2 Y  is negative. 
  The literature on Kuznets hypothesis is extensive, including both theoretical foundations 
and empirical studies. For example, see Adelman and Robinson (1989), Lindert and Williamson 
(1985) and Kaelble and Thomas (1991). Papanek and Kyn (1986) found that the relationship 
between income distribution and development is stable and robust to the inclusion of extra 
variables capable of capturing the differences in policy choices. Note that Papanek and Kyn 
(1986) consider a panel of 83 countries with only 145 observations over 1952-1978, while our 
data set has 84 countries with 583 observations covering 1950-1992. Ram (1991) investigates the 
Kuznets hypothesis using post-war US data on income distribution and does not find evidence 
supporting the Kuznets hypothesis. Kaelble and Thomas (1991) compare different empirical 
studies of the Kuznets hypothesis. While most of the previous empirical results concentrate on 
cross-country studies, we are able to explore the relationship between income distribution and 
income level using the newly compiled time-series cross-sectional data. 
The results in Panel 1 of Table 5 show that the coefficients for Y are all negative in all six 
cases, although not significant for the middle- and low-income sample. The coefficients for 
2 Y  
are positive and significant for the high-income sample, but negative and insignificant for the 
middle- and low-income sample. For the complete sample, a regular U-curve is found. Therefore, 
there is only weak evidence supporting the Kuznets hypothesis for the middle- and low-income 
sample.  
We also consider controlling for the effects of government spending when testing the 
Kuznets hypothesis in regression (30) 
  it it i it i it i i it u G Y Y GINI + + + + = τ γ β α
2 ) ( . (30)   17
The results are reported in Panel 2 of Table 5. The coefficients of Y and Y
2 and their statistical 
significance do not seem to change much when compared to those in Panel 1 for regression (29). 
The coefficients of government spending, G, on the other hand, are all negative and significant.  
Different functional forms are often used when testing the Kuznets hypothesis. The most 
commonly used is the semi-log functional form. We reestimate regressions (29) and (30) using 
the natural logarithm of Y to see whether the results for regressions (29) and (30) are subject to 
function form changes 
  it it i it i i it u Y Y GINI + + + =
2 ) (ln ln γ β α  (31) 
  it it i it i it i i it u G Y Y GINI + + + + = τ γ β α
2 ) (ln ln  (32) 
For regression (31), a regular U-curve is found for the complete sample, however, the coefficients 
are insignificant. When considering the subsamples, the high-income sample has a regular U-
curve with significant coefficients. But an inverted U-curve for the middle- and low-income 
sample is found, again with insignificant coefficients. For regression (32), a regular U-curve for 
the high-income sample is found. On the other hand, an inverted U-curve for the middle- and 
low-income sample is found. All the coefficients are significant for lnY and 
2 ) (lnY  in the two 
cases. For the complete sample, the coefficients of lnY and 
2 ) (lnY  are insignificant. Finally, the 
coefficients of government spending are all negative and significant in all cases. The results are 
similar to those reported in Table 5 and therefore not reported. The only difference worth noting 
is that a statistically significant inverted U-curve relationship is found for the middle- and low-
income sample. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results 
reported in the earlier sections. For a description of the methodology used here, see Levine and 
Renelt (1992). The essential idea is to see whether the regression results are sensitive to the   18
inclusion of other related regressors. We add a list of extra variables into the regressions (defined 
as base regressions) discussed in the earlier sections to test the robustness of the estimation results 
of our main interest. The list of extra variables includes PGRW, OPEN, FNDP and TOTSK (to be 
explained below).
10 The  base regressions are reestimated each time three different variables 
taken from the extra variable list are added. 
The variable openness (OPEN) is taken from Summers and Heston (1995). The openness 
is measured as the total trade value (imports + exports) over GDP. Other variables such as 
population growth (PGRW), financial development (FNDP) (measured as M2/GDP) and terms-
of-trade shocks (TOTSK, defined as ( M X P P ln ln ∆ − ∆ ), where  X P and  M P are export unit price 
and import unit price, respectively) are taken from the BESD (Bank Economic and Social 
Database) of the World Bank. For detailed sources of all the variables, see Table 8 (Data 
Appendix). 
  The regression results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 6 for regression 
(26) and Table 7 for regressions (29) and (30). To save space, only results for the fixed-effects 
model are reported. For regression (26), we are interested in testing the robustness of the 
regression coefficients of Y and G. For the middle- and low-income sample, the coefficients of Y 
are all negative and significant. On the other hand, G has in some cases positive but insignificant 
coefficients. For the high-income sample, the coefficients of Y are all negative but insignificant. 
The regression coefficients of G are mostly negative and significant. For the complete sample, 
some of the coefficients are insignificant, but the signs are all negative. It is not difficult to see 
that the coefficients are mostly robust to the theoretical predications and also consistent with the 
base regression coefficient estimates. 
In the sensitivity analysis, a strong and positive statistical tie has been identified between 
financial depth and income distribution. Population growth seems to have a positive effect on 
                                                 
10 One can consider a longer list of variables typically used in the growth literature, as done in Levine and   19
reducing income inequality in middle- and low-income sample. For the high-income sample and 
the complete sample, population growth tends to increase income inequality. However, the 
relationship between population growth and income inequality is statistically weak in all cases. 
  Openness seems to be negatively related to income inequality for the high-income sample 
and vise versa for the middle- and low-income sample. On the other hand, the terms-of-trade 
shock has a positive relationship with GINI for the complete sample and the high-income sample, 
while for the middle- and low-income sample, the relationship is negative. For both variables, the 
relationship with GINI is not statistically significant. 
For regressions (29) and (30) (the Kuznets hypothesis), in general, the sensitivity analysis 
supports a regularly shaped U-curve for the high-income sample with a strong statistical 
significance. However, an inverted U-curve is found for the middle- and low-income sample, 
although in most cases the coefficients on Y and Y
2 are insignificant. For the complete sample, the 
results also indicate a regular shaped U-curve, similar to the high-income sample. See the results 
in Table 7. To summarize, the sensitivity analysis in general supports the results reported in the 
earlier sections. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a test on the validity of the linearity assumption in the 
endogenous growth models. Our test is performed on the implications of this assumption on the 
dynamics of income distribution, which we illustrate using a set of examples with closed-form 
solutions. In particular, we see that in the standard Cass-Koopmans model with a concave 
production function, income distribution improves if the initial capital stock in the economy is 
less than the golden rule steady state
11. If the production function is linear in the reproducible 
                                                                                                                                                 
Renelt (1992). We use only a few important ones to highlight the main results. 
11 A similar result can be found in Stiglitz (1969). His result however is derived from an assumption on the 
saving function instead of one on preference structure.   20
factor, income distribution is time-invariant
12. With a convex production function, we conjecture 
that the income distribution worsens with income growth. Our empirical tests show that the 
income distribution tends to improve over time with income growth. Therefore, our study on the 
dynamics of income distribution supports the findings by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and 
Jones (1995a) that question the validity of the endogenous growth framework. 
 We have also obtained two empirical results that are of independent interests on the issue 
of income distribution. First, as expected, income taxation and government spending lower 
income inequalities. Second, the Kuznets hypothesis on income inequality does not hold for the 
new data set when the complete sample is used. However, there is some evidence that the 
Kuznets hypothesis holds for the middle- and low-income sample. 
                                                 
12 Bertola (1993) and Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) have similar results but they address issues 
different from ours.   21
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Figure 2: Endogenous Growth with a Linear Technology 
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 Table 3. Summary Statistics of GINI and Y by Income Groups 
 
 Sample  NOB  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
GINI 
Overall  (NOC = 84)  583 34.66  8.63 16.81  58.6 
 
High-income (NOC = 24)  282  30.94 4.36 22.9 46.3 
  Middle- and Low-income 
(NOC = 60)  301 38.14 10.07 16.81  58.6 
Y  Overall  (NOC = 84)  583 6435.15 4655.66  419  18095 
 
High-income (NOC = 24)  282 10293.48  3465.47  1542  18095 
  Middle- and Low-income 
(NOC = 60)  301 2820.38 1922.87  419  11738 
Note: Middle- and Low-income sample and High-income sample are defined according to the World 




Table 4. Estimation Results of Regression (26) 
 
Dependent variable: GINI 
Sample    Middle- and Low-income 
Sample 
  High-Income Sample    Complete Sample 
Model    (1) FE  (2) EC    (3) FE  (4) EC    (5) FE  (6) EC 
Constant       --   45.20      --  37.88      --   41.58  
    (--) (24.12)    (--) (21.12)    (--) (28.96) 
  Y    -0.70    -0.83   -0.04 -0.05   -0.09    -0.17   
   (-2.40) (-3.15)   (-0.64) (-0.77)   (-1.28) (-2.43) 
G   -0.16    -0.10   -0.30 -0.35   -0.19    -0.12   
   (-2.21) (-1.59)   (-2.41) (-3.28)   (-3.40) (-2.33) 
R
2   0.91       0.72     0.90     
F-test   42.05       22.18     47.06     
LM-test       6413.59      1747.35       10874.18  
H-test       3.01      0.99       16.80  
NOB   301    301   282 282   583    583   
NOC     60    60     24   24     84    84  
Note: FE = Fixed-effects model; EC = Error-components model; R
2 = R
2 for OLS dummy 
regression (FE); F-test = F-test for equality of dummy coefficients; LM-test = 
Lagrange Multiplier test (χ
2(1)) for error components, with null being “individual error 
components do not exist”; H-test = Hausman (1978) χ
2 specification test, with the null 
being “error components model is the correct specification”. For the fixed-effects 
model, the dummy coefficients are not reported. Same for other tables.   28
Table 5. Testing the Kuznets Hypothesis (Estimation results of regressions (29) and (30)) 
 
Dependent variable: GINI 
 
Panel 1: Base specification 
Sample    Middle- and Low-income 
Sample 
  High-Income Sample    Complete Sample 
Model    (1) FE  (2) EC    (3) FE  (4) EC    (5) FE  (6) EC 
Constant       --   42.49      --  37.54      --   42.40  
    (--) (25.56)    (--) (22.83)    (--) (36.21) 
  Y    -0.09    -0.31   -0.95 -0.95   -0.98    -1.21   
   (-0.13) (-0.49)   (-3.67) (-3.74)   (-3.93) (-5.33) 
 Y
2     -0.07   -0.06     0.04   0.04     0.04    0.05  
   (-1.09) (-0.92)    (3.64)  (3.67)    (3.69)  (4.76) 
R
2   0.91       0.73     0.90     
F-test   40.29       29.26     47.23     
LM-test       5522.24      2638.24       11755.77  
H-test       0.68      0.33       5.53  
NOB   301    301   282 282   583    583   
NOC     60    60     24   24     84    84  
 
Panel 2: The effect of government spending 
Sample    Middle- and Low-income 
Sample 
  High-Income Sample    Complete Sample 
Model    (1) FE  (2) EC    (3) FE  (4) EC    (5) FE  (6) EC 
Constant       --   44.39      --  42.98      --   44.55  
    (--) (21.62)    (--) (19.62)    (--) (29.27) 
  Y      0.16   -0.23    -1.02  -1.02    -0.94   -1.21  
    (0.23) (-0.36)   (-3.99) (-4.07)   (-3.78) (-5.32) 
 Y
2     -0.09   -0.06     0.05   0.05     0.04    0.05  
   (-1.36) (-1.03)    (3.95)  (4.00)    (3.55)  (4.77) 
G   -0.17    -0.11   -0.34 -0.38   -0.18    -0.12   
   (-2.36) (-1.67)   (-2.85) (-3.60)   (-3.26) (-2.40) 
R
2   0.91       0.74     0.90     
F-test   41.15       23.97     47.79     
LM-test       5520.76      1808.76       11162.64  
H-test       3.68      0.62       9.82  
NOB   301    301   282 282   583    583   
NOC     60    60     24   24     84    84  
   29
Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis of Regression (26) (Fixed-effects model) 
 
Dependent variable: GINI 
  1  (Base)  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The middle- and low-income sample 
  Y   -0.70    -1.196 -1.463 -0.926 -1.826 -1.262 -1.209 
  (-2.40) (-3.289) (-3.729) (-2.395) (-4.445) (-3.129) (-3.110) 
G  -0.16    -0.16 -0.086  0.001 -0.062  0.037  -0.08 
  (-2.21) (-2.209) (-0.877)  (0.010) (-0.642)  (0.366) (-0.725) 
    PGRW    -1.115 -0.241 -1.529       
   (-1.416) (-0.276) (-1.694)       
    OPEN     0.054    0.06  0.069  
   (2.486)     (2.241) (2.835)   
    FNDP      10.408   7.709   10.703 
     (3.379)   (2.425)   (3.452) 
   TOTSK       -0.109   -0.461  -0.643 
      (-0.047)   (-0.208)  (-0.287) 
     NOB   301 285 252 247 256 259 240 
     R
2   0.905 0.905  0.91 0.914 0.917 0.926 0.921 
  F-test   42.05 26.122 26.487 26.425 39.751 44.035 39.156 
 
The high-income sample 
  Y   -0.04    -0.01 -0.169 -0.028  -0.14 -0.014 -0.185 
  (-0.64) (-0.119) (-1.806) (-0.290) (-1.569) (-0.142) (-1.797) 
G  -0.30    -0.351 -0.194 -0.434 -0.233 -0.437 -0.226 
  (-2.41) (-2.690) (-1.330) (-3.017) (-1.640) (-3.045) (-1.506) 
    PGRW     -0.416  0.659  0.078    
    (-0.773)  (1.113)  (0.147)    
    OPEN    -0.029     -0.037 -0.007   
   (-2.110)     (-2.723) (-0.518)   
    FNDP      3.152   3.108   3.531 
     (2.397)   (2.484)   (2.910) 
   TOTSK       0.362   0.137  1.254 
      (0.189)   (0.070)  (0.674) 
     NOB   282 281 255 236 255 236 224 
     R
2   0.72 0.725  0.72 0.744 0.728 0.745 0.751 
  F-test   22.18 20.793 20.724 20.593  20.52 18.632 21.667 
 
The complete sample 
  Y   -0.09    -0.127 -0.327 -0.084 -0.333  -0.09 -0.335 
  (-1.28) (-1.371) (-3.094) (-0.766) (-3.211) (-0.815) (-2.747) 
G  -0.19    -0.19 -0.061 -0.075 -0.073 -0.068 -0.053 
  (-3.40) (-3.230) (-0.817) (-0.933) (-0.994) (-0.856) (-0.652) 
    PGRW     -0.35  0.366  -0.519    
    (-0.752)  (0.706)  (-1.022)    
    OPEN     0.001    -0.008  0.014  
    (0.070)    (-0.628)  (1.113)  
    FNDP      5.097   4.994   5.695 
     (3.977)   (3.949)   (4.514) 
   TOTSK       0.192   0.327  0.422 
      (0.126)   (0.217)  (0.285) 
     NOB   583 566 507 483 511 495 464 
     R
2   0.89 0.898 0.907 0.911 0.909 0.915  0.92 
  F-test   47.06 33.927 34.442  34.37 44.694 48.221 47.349   30
Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Regressions (29) and (30) (Fixed-effects model) 
 
Dependent variable: GINI 
 1  (Base)  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11 
 
The middle- and low-income sample 
  Y   -0.091 -1.226 -0.193  0.238 -0.464  -0.96 -0.315  1.003  -1.27  0.133  0.239 
  (-0.132) (-1.123) (-0.173)  (0.230) (-0.443) (-1.016)  (-0.317) (1.031)  (-1.276) (0.134) (0.254) 
 Y
2   -0.072 -0.055 -0.113 -0.138 -0.098 -0.021  -0.11 -0.187 -0.052 -0.129  -0.14 
  (-1.092) (-0.597) (-1.226) (-1.541) (-1.124) (-0.272) (-1.258) (-2.157) (-0.614) (-1.529) (-1.686) 
G        -0.162  -0.083  0  -0.065  0.022  -0.072 
        (-2.220)  (-0.841)  (0.002)  (-0.669)  (0.218)  (-0.651) 
    PGRW     0.192 -0.823 -0.115   -1.061  0.189 -0.723       
    (0.208) (-0.865) (-0.117)   (-1.303)  (0.202) (-0.746)       
    OPEN    0.057 0.058   0.046 0.051     0.054 0.053   
   (2.018) (2.103)   (1.596) (2.085)     (1.916) (1.973)   
    FNDP    6.885   8.471 7.008   9.107   7.194   8.824 
   (2.119)   (2.634) (2.161)   (2.807)   (2.185)   (2.691) 
   TOTSK      -0.563 -0.382 -0.844     -0.039   -0.448 -0.676 
     (-0.252) (-0.172) (-0.383)     (-0.017)   (-0.203) (-0.303) 
     NOB   301 252 247 236 240 285 252 247 256 259 240 
     R
2   0.911 0.913 0.918 0.918 0.923 0.905 0.911 0.916 0.917 0.927 0.922 
  F-test   40.289 22.726 24.093 23.604  39.24 23.055 22.575  23.76 38.234 43.695 38.346 
 
The high-income sample 
  Y   -0.949 -1.614 -0.779 -2.027 -1.969 -1.089 -1.718 -1.015 -1.525 -0.895 -1.884 
  (-3.674) (-4.432) (-2.141) (-4.578) (-4.663) (-3.667) (-4.839) (-2.905) (-4.313) (-2.666) (-4.795) 
 Y
2   0.043 0.062 0.037 0.076 0.074 0.047 0.065 0.043 0.058 0.039  0.07 
  (3.639) (4.195) (2.440) (4.409) (4.460) (3.778) (4.509) (2.937) (4.039) (2.738) (4.466) 
G           -0.403 -0.142 -0.486 -0.154 -0.472 -0.162 
           (-3.155) (-1.011) (-3.414) (-1.113) (-3.325) (-1.121) 
    PGRW    -0.177 -0.323 -0.337   -0.868 -0.035 -0.548       
   (-0.293) (-0.536) (-0.557)   (-1.614) (-0.060) (-0.968)       
    OPEN     -0.021  0.002   0.005  -0.018    -0.021  0.004  
    (-1.482)  (0.118)   (0.361)  (-1.314)    (-1.526)  (0.302)  
    FNDP    6.504   7.549 7.564   6.023   5.921   6.947 
   (5.039)   (5.810) (5.790)   (4.259)   (4.238)   (5.003) 
   TOTSK      -0.085  0.49  0.74    -0.4   -0.155  0.54 
     (-0.042)  (0.272)  (0.405)    (-0.211)   (-0.080)  (0.303) 
     NOB   282 255 236 224 224 281 255 236 255 236 224 
     R
2   0.728 0.745 0.741 0.772 0.772  0.74 0.743 0.755 0.746 0.754 0.774 
  F-test   29.26 25.095 22.523 27.432 25.733 22.127 23.329 21.469 22.574 19.476 24.647 
 
The complete sample 
  Y   -0.982 -1.947 -1.163 -1.841 -1.985 -1.226 -1.848 -0.953 -1.914  -0.99 -1.703 
  (-3.926) (-5.402) (-3.181) (-4.652) (-4.994) (-4.086) (-5.404) (-2.779) (-5.510) (-2.895) (-4.638) 
 Y
2   0.043 0.071 0.048 0.066 0.072  0.05 0.068  0.04  0.07 0.042 0.061 
  (3.686) (4.736) (3.048) (4.045) (4.358) (3.845) (4.665) (2.673) (4.758) (2.778) (3.942) 
G           -0.186 -0.063 -0.087 -0.061 -0.066 -0.058 
           (-3.214) (-0.866) (-1.084) (-0.851) (-0.838) (-0.736) 
    PGRW    -0.125 -0.753 -0.583   -0.757 -0.273  -0.99       
   (-0.237) (-1.404) (-1.051)   (-1.607) (-0.521) (-1.853)       
    OPEN    0.013 0.026   0.026 0.015     0.013 0.027   
   (0.935) (1.861)   (1.893) (1.183)     (0.951) (2.032)   
    FNDP    7.511   7.905 7.928   7.473   7.449   7.919 
   (5.569)   (5.787) (5.850)   (5.531)   (5.570)   (5.819) 
   TOTSK      0.144 0.047 0.237      -0.215   0.107 0.036 
     (0.096) (0.032) (0.164)      (-0.142)   (0.072) (0.025) 
     NOB   583 507 483 460 464 566 507 483 511 495 464 
     R
2   0.903 0.912 0.913 0.922 0.924 0.901 0.912 0.912 0.914 0.917 0.923 
  F-test   47.227 35.184 34.206 36.577 49.217 34.894 35.609 34.315 46.902 48.347 49.172   31
Table 8. Data Appendix 
 
Variables Sources 
(1) Gini coefficients (GINI)  Deininger, Squire and Zhang, (1995), World Bank. 
(2) Real per capita income (Y)   Summers and Heston (1994). 
(3) Government spending (G)   Summers and Heston (1994). 
(4) Openness (OPEN)  (Export + Import) / GDP, Summers and Heston 
(1994). 
(5) Financial development (FNDP)  M2 / GDP, IFS, IMF. 
(6) Terms of trade shocks (TOTSK)  ∆ln(Export price) - ∆ln(Import price), IFS (IMF) and 
World Bank Trade Statistics. 
(7) Population growth (PGRW)  World Bank Social Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 